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INTRODUCTION THE DOMINANT APPROACH TO MODELING decision making under uncertainty is
due to Savage. In this approach, one posits that the uncertainty can be represented by a space of states of the world that are comprehensive descriptions of the environment "leaving no relevant aspect undescribed" (Savage (1954, p. 9)). This paper is concerned with whether the existence of such a states space is justifiable in principle for a decision maker operating in a strategic environment. A special feature of a strategic environment is that each agent faces uncertainty not only about the primitive uncertainty corresponding to the true state of nature, but also about her opponents "type" representing all her relevant characteristics. It is well known that this feature leads naturally to concern with infinite hierarchies and a problem of infinite regress that must be resolved in order to justify the existence of a space of types and therefore a space of states of the world.
In typical formulations of games it is assumed that players are subjective expected utility maximizers. If it is further assumed that each player's von Neumann-Morgenstern index is common knowledge, then the only relevant characteristic of a player about which opponents are uncertain is her Bayesian prior probability measure over the relevant state space. Thus the analyst's attempt to describe the states of the world facing each player leads naturally to an infinite hierarchy of probability measures representing beliefs. This problem of infinite regress in beliefs has been tackled rigorously by Mertens and Zamir (1985) , who construct a well-defined topological space of "types" having the feature that the type of each player is comprehensive in that it identifies, up to a homeomorphism, joint beliefs about the state of nature and the types of opponents. It is apparent that the relevance of hierarchies of beliefs is not restricted to the framework of subjective expected utility maximization. Rather, it is valid as long as individual preferences are "based on beliefs" that are representable, by a probability measure; Machina and Schmeidler (1992, 1995) define this class of preferences precisely and refer to them as "probabilistically sophisticated," or "Bayesian rational."
We have three primary reasons for being dissatisfied with the noted construction of a state space. The first is methodological. In Savage's model, states of the world logically precede the specification of axioms. Therefore, it is at the very least inconsistent with the Savage approach to specify the state space only after adopting a set of axioms for preferences, whether those underlying subjective expected utility maximization or the weaker set underlying Bayesian rationality. More importantly perhaps, the fact that axioms are presumed in the specification of states of the world makes it impossible to formalize them within the resulting framework. This methodological concern is pertinent even if the modeler wishes to assume that players are Bayesian rational and that this is common knowledge. Such an assumption must be understood informally in the standard Bayesian framework (Aumann (1987) ). Vardi (1992) and Heifetz and Samet (1993) , for example). These studies cannot be viewed as special cases of ours. They show that generally transfinite hierarchies are needed to provide a complete description of the uncertainty facing each agent.2 On the other hand, our framework shares with the probability-theoretic literature cited the feature that a denumerable construction suffices for a types space, given a compact Hausdorff parameter space. As a result, our analysis casts further light on "when" a denumerable construction suffices.
We proceed as follows: The next section provides an informal outline of the hierarchical structure and infinite regress problem that arise in attempting to describe the uncertainty facing players in a game. It then describes three instances where resolution of this infinite regress problem is important. These applications serve to motivate the ensuing formal analysis. Section 3 describes the class of individual preferences that we admit and the topology adopted for the space of preferences. Some noteworthy subspaces of preferences are studied in Section 4. The construction of the space of types is carried out in Section 5 and the incorporation of common knowledge is examined in Section 6. Most proofs are relegated to appendices.
INFORMAL OUTLINE AND APPLICATIONS

Incomplete and Complete State Spaces
Consider a decision maker operating under uncertainty, where the uncertainty is represented by the state space S, the space of states of the world as in Savage. The objects of choice are acts over S, that is, (suitably measurable) functions from S to the set of outcomes X = [0, 1]. Denote by AS) this set of acts and by 9(S) the set of "regular" preference orderings over AS). More detailed and precise definitions of these sets will be provided later. For now, we proceed informally assuming that the sets M(S) and 9A(S) are well defined for any S. Think of 09,(S) as a large class of preferences limited mainly by "technical" conditions and containing subjective expected utility preferences as a small subset. This framework may be applied to describe choice behavior by supposing that the set of feasible choices corresponds to a subset of AS) and that a feasible act that maximizes the decision maker's preference, an element of 9(S), is chosen.
Suppose now that the decision maker is a player in a game. The choice of strategy can be modeled as above once the suitable set of states of the world S is specified, by associating each strategy with an act over S. The outstanding question is "what is S?" To proceed, suppose for notational simplicity that there are two players, denoted i and j, with strategy sets Ai =Ai. Each player is uncertain about the parameters of the game being played and/or the strategy choice of her opponent. This primitive uncertainty may be represented by some set D. If i faced uncertainty only about the true w E (, then her choice of 2See Lipman (1991) for another example of a nondenumerable hierarchical construction. strategy could be modeled as indicated above: Given j's strategy choice aj, the perceived payoff of i depends on her strategy ai and on the true state t. Therefore, each ai determines a mapping from (2 into outcomes in X = [0,1], that is, each ai determines an act in A (2). Accordingly, i's strategy choice is determined by her preference ordering over 9(n), an element of 9(n). But i does not know j's chosen ai. By the above for j, she could infer it from knowledge of j's preference ordering in 9(n), but she is uncertain about her opponent's preferences. Thus i's "second-order state space" is 2 x 9( (2). Were this to represent all the uncertainty facing i, then we could argue as above, identifying each ai with an act in A(2 x,9((2)) and deriving her strategy choice from her "second-order preferences," an element in 9A((2 x,9((2)). Similarly for j. But since i's second-order preferences are unknown to j and since they are useful for predicting what i will do, j faces the uncertainty represented by the state space (2x9A((2) x,9( (2 x,9(()).
Proceeding, one is led to the sequence of state spaces (1) SO =n SSn= Sn-1 x ,D(S -1), n > O, and similarly for j. Each state space Si (or Si) is an incomplete description of the uncertainty facing i (or j) since, as above, given that Si describes some of the uncertainty facing j, then i, in predicting j's behavior, faces uncertainty also about j's preferences over A(SD). Therefore, to model the decision problem facing each player requires first that one prove the existence of a state space that is large enough to incorporate all of the above uncertainty.
Comparison with the Bayesian case may be helpful. When preferences conform to subjective expected utility and when vNM indices of both players are common knowledge, then "beliefs" about any given states space S uniquely determine preferences over AS). Therefore, the reasoning outlined above leads to a hierarchy of "beliefs about beliefs." More specifically, since in the Savage model beliefs are represented by a probability measure, the sequence of incomplete state spaces takes the form (2) Si= , Si = Si1 x A(S1), n > 0, where A(Si l) denotes the set of probability measures on SJ' . These are the incomplete state spaces considered in Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Brandenburger and Dekel (1993). Returning to the general non-Bayesian framework and proceeding heuristically, ask what conditions are natural to impose on complete state spaces Si and Si, were they to exist. The uncertainty facing i consists of both the primitive uncertainty represented by (2 and, by the reasoning described above, by j's "feelings" about the exhaustive uncertainty that she faces, where such "feelings" are embodied in the way that j ranks acts over her state space si. In other words, i is uncertain about (2 x,9(Si). But by hypothesis, Si represents all the uncertainty facing i. We conclude that S' and Si should satisfy Conversely, given spaces satisfying these restrictions, then a type ti E T' for i is a comprehensive description of i because it includes, through the homeomorphism -, a specification of i's "feelings" about both the primitive uncertainty Q2 and about the type of her opponent. The technical contribution of this paper is to describe a mathematically rigorous and natural construction of types spaces, given a very general specification of preferences via 9A. We claimed in the introduction that the existence of such types spaces was important for some foundational and conceptual issues in game theory and in economic theory more broadly. To buttress this claim, we proceed now to describe three applications. The above game formulation and equilibrium notion have been applied in Lo (1995) to examine the effects of uncertainty aversion in first and second price sealed bid auctions with independent private values. Lo assumes that it is common knowledge that players have preferences in the multiple-priors class (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) ). Such common knowledge assumptions can be expressed formally as described in Section 6.
Foundations for Solutions Concepts
In the decision-theoretic approach to game theory, each player's problem of choosing a strategy is cast as a single agent decision problem under uncertainty. Then, assuming that players are Bayesian rational, alternative assumptions regarding their beliefs about the uncertainty that they face deliver axiomizations for various solution concepts. An example of such an argument, that is the focus here, is the theorem characterizing correlated rationalizability and survival of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies as the (equivalent) implications of rationality and common knowledge of rationality (Tan and Werlang (1988, Theorems 5.2-5.3)).
For the reasons given in the introduction, it is desirable to extend such arguments beyond the framework of subjective expected utility maximizing players. The types space constructed in this paper permits such an extension. Here we provide a brief indication of how it may be developed; see Epstein (1995) Therefore, the implications of rationality and common knowledge of rationality are delivered by answering the following formal question: "For which (ai, a1) EA2 does there exist (ti, tj) e TI* x T7* such that (at, ti) E Qi and (aj, tj) E Q,?" Epstein (1995) characterizes such strategy profiles in the case of finite games, delivering a notion of rationalizability (and corresponding "dominance") that is not tied to the subjective expected utility framework. Because AA x T) is a large class of preferences, the corresponding notions of rationality and rationalizability are weak. However, they can be strengthened by assuming that a more restrictive model of preference is common knowledge.
Two products of such an analysis merit emphasis. First, new solution concepts for normal form games are provided that have clear and appealing decision-theoretic foundations and that can accommodate empirically attractive (e.g., uncertainty averse) preferences.5 It is hoped that these solution concepts will prove useful in applications. Another product is the deepening of the foundations for the expected utility-based notion of rationalizability due to the fact that common knowledge of expected utility maximization may be expressed formally in our framework.
Single Agent Decision Making
The standard model of information, a partition of the state space, is based on strong assumptions about the decision maker's knowledge and information processing abilities, most notable negative introspection-if something is not known, it is known that it is not known. Geanakoplos (1989) proposes nonpartitional models of information to capture the decision maker's imperfect understanding of the universe. He then assumes expected utility maximization and Bayesian updating to deliver a model of preference that is used to address issues in applied game theory. This approach of pasting Bayes rule onto a nonpartitional information structure is criticized by Morris (1994 Morris ( , 1996 as being ad hoc because the usual decision theoretical justification for Bayes' rule is based on a form of dynamic consistency that, in turn, implies partition information. It is suggested, therefore, that a unified treatment of preference and (imperfect) knowledge is required and Morris makes some progress in providing such a unification. However, Morris (1994) identifies a circularity in his model and suggests that it is best dealt with by a hierarchical model of preference. The issue is whether there exists a state space rich enough so that states contain a description of (preferences and) knowledge of the state space. Here we show that the hierarchies constructed in this paper, suitably reinterpreted, resolve this issue. There may be some appeal to the view that knowledge is prior to and helps to determine preference. On the other hand, we emphasize, as does Morris, that there is a strong tradition in economics of choice-based, or equivalently, preference-based modeling. Savage's derivation of subjective probability from preference is a prominent example. Another notable recent example is Lipman (1995) , where a decision maker's reasoning is derived from preferences.
The reinterpretation just mentioned is that we view the single decision maker as being uncertain (about the state of nature and) about his own preferences rather than about the preferences of another. The discussion leading to (4) is readily modified to relate to the decision maker's introspection; she is uncertain not only about the true state of nature in 12 but also about how she "feels" about this uncertainty and how she "feels about her feelings" regarding the state of nature and so on. At issue is whether there exists a space T large enough to model both introspection to all finite levels and introspection about T itself so that any type t c T represents the exhaustive introspection of the decision maker. Formally, the issue is the existence of T such that T is homeomorphic to f9(n x T). Let the function W: T -*9(f2 x T) represent such a homeomorphism.
The following connection can now be made to formal nonpartitional models of knowledge. Let S = n x T and for each event A c 5, say that the decision maker knows A at the state s = (c, t) if '(t) E=((2 x TIA). Define K(A) to be the set of states s at which A is known. Then K is a knowledge operator satisfying K(S) = S, K(0) = 0, and K(A) n K(B) = K(A n B). Other arguably more problematic properties of K required by the partition model are not necessarily satisfied. However, they can be imposed as additional assumptions expressed as restrictions on the decision maker's type. For example, the knowledge axiom "know that you know" may be expressed in the form: For every A c n x T, IW(t) E9'( n X TJA) f'P(t) E=(( 2 X TJ n X r1l9(Qn X TIA)).
Arguments similar to those in Section 6 can be used to construct the subset of types satisfying this condition; similarly for the axiom of negative introspection.
Though the hypothesis of uncertainty about own preference is uncommon in economic theory, it seems natural given an agent who does not perfectly understand the nature of the primitive state space Q and who reflects on the nature and degree of his misunderstanding. Finally, we note that uncertainty about own preferences has been shown to be useful also in modeling preference for flexibility (Kreps (1979) ) and behavior given unforeseen contingencies (Kreps (1992)).
THE SPACE OF PREFERENCES
This section provides a formal definition of the space of regular preference orderings.
Begin with a state space S, a compact Hausdorff topological space. Preference will be defined on s(S), the set of all Borel measurable functions from S to X = [0, 1]. In order to describe the class of preferences that will be considered, it is convenient to designate various subsets of AS). Call an act simple if its range is finite. Call an act f upper semicontinuous ( While this definition of "preferences" substantially limits the class of binary relations and therefore the generality of our analysis, we feel that the above conditions are attractive on the grounds of being both readily interpretable and not unduly restrictive, as demonstrated by examples below. The first two properties are self-explanatory and common. In particular, the assumption that there exists a unique "certainty equivalent" for each act seems natural in the present setting. The regularity conditions are perhaps unconventional restrictions on preferences, but are nevertheless readily interpretable. Roughly, the first requires that any act can be approximated from below, arbitrarily well in preference, by simple usc acts; the second requires that any g in -9-(S) can be approximated from above, arbitrarily well in preference, by simple lsc acts. Further discussion of the regularity conditions follows shortly.
Denote 
U.4 OUTER REGULARITY: u(g) = inf{u(h): h ? g, h E k(S)}, Vg E u(S).
Equally important and immediate is that any function u satisfying these properties defines a unique preference relation a (satisfying the properties (P.1)-(P.4)) by f' , ,f ;-*u(f ') 2 u(f)
Therefore, we can identify _9'(S) with the set of functions u satisfying (U.1)-(U.4).
Such functions are referred to interchangeably as utility functions, certainty equivalents and, because of the identification, as preference orders. In particular, we often write u E-'(S). This identification is convenient since the analysis to follow is more simply written in terms of utility functions rather than binary relations. We emphasize, however, that everything that follows can be rewritten explicitly and exclusively in terms of preferences, that is, we are indeed dealing with a space of preference orders rather than nonordinal utility functions. The regularity conditions (U.3) and (U.4) resemble more familiar restrictions on probability measures (see Section 4.1); think of u as a measure and replace g, h, and f by closed, open, and measurable subsets of S, respectively. (To motivate the latter substitutions, note that the indicator function for a closed set is usc, and so on.) The regularity conditions also imply that a utility function is uniquely determined by the certainty equivalents it assigns to simple lsc acts, much like a regular probability measure is uniquely determined by its values on open sets. This formal similarity may help to motivate our specification of _9?i(S); in any event, it "explains" how we arrived at it. The noted similarity is also an important reason that a denumerable hierarchy suffices here as it does in the case of hierarchies of probability measures. In particular, the restriction to regular utility functions permits the proof of a "Kolmogorov extension theorem" for utility functions (See Theorem D'.2 and Lemma D.3). The next step is to define a topology on 9(S). We employ the topology r having the subbasis consisting of sets of the form One justification for the choice of T is pragmatic, that is, "it works," as shown below. We view the compact Hausdorff property of (09_A(S), T) as another justification, or at least as a confirmation that the topology is "reasonable," that is because compactness ensures that T does not contain "too many" open sets while the Hausdorff property ensures that it does not contain "too few" open sets. More precisely, note that for any other topology T', T' must violate compactness if it is strictly stronger than r and it must violate Hausdorff if it is strictly weaker than T (see Royden (1988, p. 192 
)).
Additional perspective on the topology T may be provided by considering some specific alternatives. Topologies frequently adopted for spaces of preferences include the topology of closed convergence (Hildenbrand (1974) and Grodal (1974) ) and the Kannai topology (Kannai (1970)). These presume that the domain of preference is itself a topological space and that all preferences are continuous. Further, local compactness of the domain is needed in order that the Kannai topology be well-defined and that the closed convergence topology be Hausdorff. There remains also the need, for the purpose of the construction of hierarchies, to ensure that the topological space of preferences inherits suitable properties from the domain. For example, a seemingly useful result is that the property "compact separable metric" is passed on under the closed convergence topology (Hildenbrand (1974, pp. 19-20) ). However, we are not aware of any reasonable topologies on the domain Y(S) that deliver the required properties. For example, Y(S) is in general not locally compact under the sup-norm topology and it fails to be compact separable metric under the product topology. Therefore, the example demonstrates that in general regular utility functions need not be sup-norm-continuous or strictly monotonic. In this specific example, SAS) is in fact compact separable metric under the usual topology on [0, 1]n and the above cited theorem of Hildenbrand delivers a compact separable metric space of (continuous) preferences. However, the finiteness of the state space is critical and finiteness is lost at the second stage of the hierarchy, that is, once one's opponents preferences themselves constitute part of the uncertainty facing a player.
PREFERENCE SUBSPACES
We turn to some noteworthy subspaces of 9(S) that will help to clarify the nature of (0(S), r). In particular, we hope that the specializations to follow will convince the reader that our choice of regularity conditions and topology are sensible at least in the sense that they are consistent with more familiar models.
Expected Utility
Denote by A(S) the space of regular Borel probability measures endowed with the weak convergence topology, where regularity for p E A(S) means:7 R.1 p(A) = sup{p(K): K cA compact} V measurable A.
R.2 p(K) = inf{p(G): G DK open), V compact K.
Note that A(S) is compact Hausdorff; this is implied by the Riesz Representation and Alaoglu Theorems (Royden (1988, pp. 352, 237) ). This is a simple corollary of Theorem 4.2. A possible extension of the theorem is worth noting. Note that it is the probabilistic sophistication of each up that is important above, not the expected utility functional form itself. In particular, the class of all u's corresponding to some "belief' p E A(S) and a fixed "well-behaved" functional for evaluating risky prospects is also compact and homeomorphic to A(S). The reader is referred to Machina and Schmeidler (1992) 
The subset of convex capacities warrants separate mention. A capacity is called convex if for all measurable sets A and B c(A U B) + c(A n B) 2 c(A) + c(B).
Schmeidler (1989) has demonstrated that convexity of the capacity c corresponds to a form of uncertainty aversion for uC and thus defines an interesting specialization of (8). The set of all convex capacities is closed in F(S).9 By Theorem 4.2, it follows that the set of all Choquet expected utility functions with convex capacity and a fixed vNM index is closed in ,9(S).
Knowledge Subspaces
It will be of interest to consider the subset of ,9(S) that corresponds to "knowledge that A c S is true." Given u, say that u knows the Borel measurable event A if S \A is null in the sense of Savage, that is, if for all f and f' in As), (10) f=f' on A =u(f) = u(f').
It will be useful to extend this definition also to nonmeasurable subsets of S. Therefore, if B is an arbitrary subset of S, say that u knows B if there exists a measurable event A cB such that u knows A.10 Finally, adopt the notation A'(SIB) {u E:9(S): u knows B} cOA(S).
We can prove the following intuitive and useful result:
THEOREM 4.3: If A c S is compact, then 9(A) is homeomorphic to the compact set 9(S IA).
Given a utility function u, the following property of the associated knowledge will be important below: "If {Ak} is a declining sequence of subsets of S such that u knows each Ak, then u knows also n Ak." Refer to any utility function satisfying this property as exhibiting continuous knowledge. Expected utility functions satisfy this property because of the countable additivity of probability 9This follows readily from the characterization of regular convex capacities in Anger (1971, Theorem 3).measures, more particularly because a countable union of null events is null. We have not determined whether every utility function in 9'(S) exhibits continuous knowledge, but we can show that many do. To be precise, all utility functions that are continuous with respect to the sup-norm topology on acts satisfy this property. This class includes (Choquet) expected utilities. THEOREM 4.4: If u e-9(S) is sup-norm continuous, then it exhibits continuous knowledge.
A TYPES SPACE
Refer to the two-player game situation described informally in Section 2.1. The incomplete state spaces in (1) are well defined, because S_ -and SJ_-compact Hausdorff imply the same for S' and SJ. The latter two spaces are equal and can be denoted Sn. This leads us to the sequence of incomplete state spaces Sn defined by" 
Similarly, we can write T = -= T, where the types space T should satisfy (12) T -hmeo 9(Q x T).
We proceed to construct such a types space T. This is done by adapting and extending the Brandenburger-Dekel (1993) argument from their Bayesian framework to the present framework. It is natural to represent player i by her "feelings about Q," her "feelings about j's feelings about f2" and so on to all finite orders, that is, since The subspace of To consisting of coherent types is denoted T,.
If differential information about l2 is modeled via partitions (or o-algebras), i will generally be uncertain not only about j's preferences on Borel-measurable acts over (2, but also about j's partition. Such uncertainty is modeled in Heifetz and Samet (1993), but is ignored in a recursion such as (11).
Each coherent type determines a unique preference ordering on acts over the uncertainty space [2 x To, as shown by the following preliminary result: THEOREM 
5.1: T1 is homeomorphic to 4([ x TO).
REMARK: The proof, given in Appendix D, is based on a "Kolmogorov extension theorem" for preferences that generalizes the well known theorem for probability measures (see Bochner (1960 This condition represents a restriction on no and P*(?2 x T) that is necessary and sufficient in order that there exist a subspace T* of T that embodies common knowledge of no and P*(Q x T).14 We are still left with the question "is this condition satisfied in a broad class of cases outside the expected utility framework?" The next theorem provides an affirmative answer by showing that it is satisfied under two alternative sets of assumptions.
THEOREM 6.1: Let no c n and P*(f x T) c,9(n x T). Assume either (a) or (b), where:
(a) no and P*(l x T) are closed.
(b) Every u E P*(Q x T) exhibits continuous knowledge (defined in Section 4.3).
Then T* c T defined above satisfies, T* hmeo P*(Q X TIQn0 x T*), 14 It is possible that some T(k) is empty and therefore that T* is also empty. This is not a difficulty in modeling common knowledge; it merely indicates that kth order knowledge of both the event nO and the model of preference P* are mutually inconsistent and therefore naturally the same applies to common knowledge of both. Since P*(Q x T10) = 0, all formulae retain meaning in such cases. In any event, below we describe conditions that guarantee nonemptiness of T*.
where the indicated homeomorphism is the restriction of W. Further, T* is a nonempty closed subspace of T if (a) holds and if each T(k) is nonempty.
The proof of sufficiency of (a) is similar to that of Theorem 5.2. The proof of sufficiency of (b) follows immediately from (20) and the definition of continuous knowledge.
REMARK: Under suitable strengthening of (b), we can show that T* is nonempty. Assume that rather than being restricted to the particular state space Q2 x T, the model P* is a correspondence that assigns to any compact Hausdorff state space S a nonempty subspace P*(S) of 9(S). Such a formulation of "model of preference" seems natural if one is thinking of axiomatically based models. Assume further that for each S and s E S, the evaluation utility function us E P*(S), where us(f) f(s) Vf E9(S). Nonemptiness of T* can then be proven by constructing an example along the lines of that concluding Section 5.
Consider assumptions (a) and (b) in turn. With regard to the former, the assumption that P*(f2 x T) is closed is restrictive; for example, it excludes the class of all strictly increasing utility functions in 9(l? x T). On the other hand, this assumption is satisfied by the expected utility and Choquet expected utility model defined in Theorems 4.1-4.2.
While (a) restricts no to be compact, the alternative sufficient condition (b) in the theorem places no restrictions on the event ?2o, other than what is implied by its being a subset of compact Hausdorff space ?2. By Dugundji (1966, XI.8), the implicit restriction on ?2o, viewed as a topological space with the induced topology, is that it be completely regular. In other words, (b) shows that we can model common knowledge of the combination of any completely regular event ?2o and any model of preference P* that satisfies continuous knowledge. As we saw in Section 4.3, any sup-norm continuous utility satisfies knowledge continuity and so (b) has wide applicability. Finally, through (b) we can model common knowledge of strictly monotone and knowledge continuous preferences, though we noted earlier that common knowledge of strict monotonicity alone is beyond the scope of (a).
The significance of Theorem 6.1 merits emphasis. In standard Bayesian models of differential information, it is often assumed that the "structure" of the model is common knowledge. In particular, common knowledge of expected utility preferences is assumed. But, such common knowledge is not well defined formally and therefore must be understood informally (Aumann (1987) ). However, within the wider framework of the class 9 of preferences, where nonexpected utility preferences can be imagined by each player, (common) knowledge of expected utility preferences becomes meaningful. In particular, the preceding Theorem (with ?2o = ?2) shows that common knowledge of expected utility and Choquet expected utility preferences have formal meaning in our framework because such models of preference correspond to appropriate sub- Therefore u(gx) = infk U(gk).
Step 2: We use (28) to prove knowledge continuity. It is enough to deal with (declining) events Ak that are measurable. Let A, fl Ak and f e9(S); we need to show that The left side assumes only finitely many values. Therefore, for a suitable subsequence of {Xk), it assumes a constant value a, say a = a, + a2, and, after renaming the subsequence, we have Vk, Xk E (K1 nAk) n (K2 nlAk) and Xk c (Ki nAk) Vi > 2. Without loss of generality, let Xk -tx. Then x E (Kl nlA) ni (K2 nA), implying g1A(X) 2 a, + a2. The right side of (37) also assumes only finitely many values. Therefore, by taking a suitable subsequence, we may assume that E:1= 1u(xk) is constant. We obtain the following contradiction to h ?glA: g1(x) 2 al + a2 =Ei.=1a 1 K, n Ak(Xk) > ET I pI Ui(Xk) = liminf ETl P1i1Ui(Xk) 2 h(x), where the last inequality is due to h being lsc.
Q.E.D. 
